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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

JACK LAYTON AND
MARIAN LAYTON
a partnership dba
DENVER AUTO AUCTION,
Respondents,

No. 8238

APPEAL

vs.

KAY CLARK,
Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH, HONORABLE CLARENCE E. BAKER, JUDGE.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF F·ACTS
The facts in this case are stipulated to and are as
follows:
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The respondents (plaintiffs in the District Court)
in Denver, Colorado, are in the business of selling automobiles wholesale by auction exclusively to automobile
dealers for resale. The respondents conditionally sold
three automobiles to M. R. Bruce, a licensed automobile
dealer doing business as RaDon Auto Sales at Salt
Lake City, Utah. The respondents gave possession of
those automobiles to M. R. Bruce who brought them
to Salt Lake City and placed them on his used car lot
for resale. The appellant, Kay Clark, in good faith
purchased one of these automobiles for the sum of
$1400.00 in the usual course of trade and paid in full
for said automobile, the used car dealer representing
that he was the "lawful owner thereof and of all interest therein". (Exhibit B).
The respondents brought a Replevin action to
secure possession of the automobile, and the Trial
Court held that the respondent had superior title to
the automobile and could recover it from appellant.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD THAT RESPONDENTS ARE ESTOPPED TO ASSERT THEIR TITLE
AS AGAINST APPELLANT, A BONA F'IDE PURCHASER
FOR VALUE FROM A DEALER, AND THAT APPELLANT,
THEREFORE, OBTAINED GOOD TITLE THERETO.
POINT II
THE TRIAL ·COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD THAT IN
COLORADO A RESERVATION OF TITLE IN A SALE OF
PERSONAL PROPERTY IS REGARDED AS A CHATTEL
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MORTGAGE, AND IS REQUIRED TO BE FILED AS REQUIRED BY THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE STATUTE.,.AND
THERE _BEI~G NQ QOMPLIANCE WITH THE COLO~Al)O
STATUTE ON THIS .MATTER THE RESERVATION OF
TITLE IN THE. RESPONDENT IS INVALID.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD THAT RESPONDENTS ARE ESTOPPED TO ASSERT THEIR TITLE
AS AGAINST APPELLANT, A BONA FIDE. PURCHASER
FOR VALUE FROM A DEALER, AND THAT APPELLANT,
THEREFORE, OBTAINED GOOD TITLE THERETO.

The general law on this point is dealt with in 47
A.L.R. 85 and in 88 A.L.R. 109. The numerous citations
appearing in these annotations le:ave no :.doubt that the
general rule appears to be: that where goods are sold;.
on conditional sale, with express or implied· authority·
to the buyer· to resell them, a purchaser from the buyer ".
obtain~ good title thereto. ~·
Basically ·one cannot convey a. greater title than
he has.· This basic rule conflicts_ with the .attempt to
prote'ct a bona fide ·purchaser, and, ~~- ex?~P~ion has
been made in most jurisdictions, either on the. theory
of esfoppel·o::r 'agency (indicia of title; plus pos~ession)
where the buyer takes .the goods for -resale and is a
dealer in such goods. , The ·sub~':endee in that case, if
he is a purchaser in good faith" hnd 'fbr va]ue, 'is protected. Whether he is· protected in t~is ·state or :riot will
depend upon the philosophy or ·the· court and· which ·:of '
the ~wo ii.J.nocent p~rtie~ · involy.eq _)hey would rather
protect. "'\Ve Jeel that the appelhint should prevail. The
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burden and risk of dealer's dishonesty should be rightfully placed on those who sell or entrust him with possession of goods without obtaining payment therefor;
this burden and risk should not be placed upon those
who purchase from such a dealer in the regular course
of trade.
Turning to the Utah law we have felt that it favors
the appellant's viewpoint and adhere to that decision
in spite of the decision of the trial court.
For example, the following comes from the syllabus
of the Harrison v. Auto Securities Co., et al, 257 P. 677:
''Innocent purchaser of auto from local agents
held entitled to possession as against firm holding
state agency, which intrusted car to local agents
for purpose of exhibiting it and soliciting sales,
though sale of particular car was without authority.
Principal is bound by acts of agents which
fall within apparent .scope of authority, and will
not be permitted to deny agent's authority, as
against innocent third parties who dealt with
agents in good faith.
Where one of two innocent parties must suffer from wrongful act of third person, loss should
fall on one who, by .his conduct, created circumstance's which enabled third party to perpetrate
wrong and cause loss.''
So, also in the case of Jones v. Commercial lnvet.

Trust 64 Utah 151, 22~ P~~· 896:
"I am of the opinion that when the appellant
plac.ed its automobile into. the possession of the
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Naylor-Woodruff Motor Company for the purpose of sale, knowing that the latter was a retail
dealer in such cars, and that it would hold out
and advertise itself as the owner thereof and as
having the right to sell the same, and permitted
the dealer to exhibit the car for sale in its salesroom, under the circumstances shown in this case,
it thereby clothed the dealer with such apparent
ownership and authority to sell that it ought to
be, and is estopped to deny as against Jones, who
purchased the car from the dealer in good faith,
for full value, in the regular course of the seller's
business and at retail, and without any knowledge
or notice of the appellant's claim thereto, that
the dealer had the right to tnake the sale and to
assert its superior title to the car.''
The Harrison v. Auto Securities case (supra) is also
to be found in 57 A.L.R. 388, with an annotation on page
393. Quoting from that annotation we have the following:
"The reported case (I. E. Harrison v. Auto
Securities) holds that an innocent purchaser for
value from a retail dealer in automobiles, of an
automobile intrusted to the dealer by his principal solely f.or the purpose of exhibition, the
soliciting of sales, and the holding of prospective
purchasers, acquire title, and is entitled to possession thereto, notwithstanding the lack of
actual or implied authority of the agent to sell.
A somewhat similar ruling was made in Jones
Commercial Invest. Trust (supra) where the
court held that the owner of an automobile who
placed it in possession of a retail dealer in such

'V.
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cars,..knowing that the dealer would hold out and
:·.advertise· itself as· owner ·and as having the right
to ·selL· it,·. and who· permitted the dealer to .·ex.
hibit ·the· car for sale, thereby clothed the latter
with an apparent ownership -and authority to
sell, and was estopped to deny, as against a bona
·fide purchaser. in· good· faith and for full value
in regular course of business, and at retail, that
the dealer had no right to make the sale or assert
a superior title.''
These Utah cases, seem to go along with appellant's
theory ·of the law.
·
Respondent attempts to throw doubt on the position
of the Utah Court by reference to Swartz vs. White re.
ported in 13 P. (2d) 643, Utah case 1932. It is only by
misconstruing this case that 'the trial court could rule
against the appellant. We definitely do not feel that ·this
case justifies any such a holding· for .. tlie.folloWing rea·
sons: (1) the facts are different; it is not a case of the
owner giving a dealer possession for -r~sale_in the ordinary cours_e of. ~~siness ;- (2) Section 41-1-72, 1953 Utah
Code Annotated which that case interpreted as manda·
tory is expressly analyzed and overruled in the case of
Jackson v~_James~ 97 Utah 41~89_P. 2d..23g asfollows:
·'~These provisions~ (i.e. 41-1-72) -are not absolute,
· · manda:tory, ·.or· controlling· <in· ·their· application.
... :They: d·o ·not corife~··:b·:r:·aeriy·· srib~ta:ritive rights.
· --They are procedur.al __or eVidentiary··in nature~"
~

••••••

...

0 •• ".

~

-

•

.(3) ~he·case.:"its~lf.-on pag~ 6~5. e~pr~ssly::re~ogJ:li.zes .that
the. principle..of· .estoppel can. create(· a: b~tter. title. in.the
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transferee than the transferor himself had, and this is
the position that we take in the present case.
We will make no further comment on the law or t·he
facts. Enough has been stated to present the theory and
reasoning behind it for the court's consideration. The
cases are many and the annotations quite exhaustive on
these matters. To pre'Sent more would not a:dd to the
knowledge of the court or aid it in the determination of
this conflict, as the cases and annotation will do that
better. than this short brief. We refer you to them and
to the brief of a sister case, also on appeal to this court:
Joe Heaston and H. R. Ellis, a partnership, dba HeastonEllis Motor Company, Respondents, vs. Manuael l\iartinez, Appellant, Appeal No..................... involving the
same principles of law.
POINT II
THE TRIAL ·COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD THAT IN
COLORADO A RESERVATION OF TITLE IN A SALE OF
PERSONAL. PROPERTY IS REGARDED AS A CHATTEL
MORTGAGE, AND IS REQUIRED TO BE FILED AS REQUIRED BY THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE STATUTE, AND
THERE BEING NO COMPLIANCE WITH THE COLORADO
STATUTE ON THIS MATTER THE RESERVATION OF
TITLE IN THE RESPONDENT IS INVALID.

In Colorado a reservation of title in a sale of personal property is regarded as a chattel mortgage, and is
required to be filed as required by the chattel mortgage
statute (47 A.L.R. 86); since there has been no offer or
stipulation of evidence of compliance with the Colorado
statute or law on this matter, the reservation of title in
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this case is invalid.
CONCLUSION
The holding of the trial court should be reversed.
Respondents by placing M. R. Bruce in possession of the
car, ·and by allowing him to transport it from Denver
to Salt Lake City for purposes of resale cannot now
assert their claim of title against the appellant who purchased from Bruce in the usual course of trade for value
and without notice of respondents' claim. This conclusion is inescapable in the light of the better reasoned
cases and upon well established general rules of estoppel;
and in addition rests upon the well known principle that
where one of two innocent parties must suffer from the
wrongful act of ·a third person, the loss should fall on
the one who, by his conduct, created the circumstances
which enabled the third party to perpetrate the wrong
and cause the loss.
It will be seen then that the position of t.he appellant
rests not only upon strong and compelling equitable
grounds insofar as it protects the innocent purchaser
from ·a ret·ail dealer, but would also ultimately accrue to
the advantage of the wholesale used car dealer himself.
If we follow the respondent's contention to its logical
conclusion, an intending purchaser in order to secure
his position as a bona fide purchaser for value would
have to require that the retail dealer before purchase
show him a re~stration certificate indicating a transfer
the Department of Motor Vehicles of
on the records of
.
.
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the State of Utah. With the fluctuating value of used
cars, such a requirement would ultimately wreck havoc
with the ret,ail dealers' business, and, indirectly, of
course, the wholesaler business also, and would impede
the normal flow of commerce in that trade. And when
this condition is added to the fact that it would uproot
well established principles of law, which have been repeatedly enunciated by the courts of the land, we submit
that the position of the appellant is the only tenable one.

We urge, therefore, that the decision should be reversed with instructions to enter judgment in favor of
the appellant.
Respectfully submitted,
CHRIS T. PRAGGASTIS and
JOHN E. STONE
Attorneys forr Appellant

Received a copy of the foregoing brief this ------------ day
of September, 1954.

,,
Attorney for Respondent
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